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ADVERSE POSSESSION OF ABANDONED
URBAN HOUSING
Two contrasting figures walk the streets of Manhattan. One is tall,
erect. His wide-brimmed hat looks distinctly out of place. His com-
panion exhibits a perceptible limp. The little man talks incessantly,
punctuating his remarks with a consumptive cough. The two men rip
down a boarded-up doorway to enter a barren building. Still chat-
tering, the small man leads the way up the staircase and into a stark
room. Gesturing broadly he proclaims, "This is my home."
Fans of Dustin Hoffman will recognize the scene from Midnight Cow-
boy.1 Critically minded legal theorists will question the legal accuracy
of Hoffman's claim.
The right to adversely possess abandoned urban housing has not
been firmly established in any jurisdiction. On the other hand, the
steady increase in abandonment makes it appropriate to explore the
desirability of adverse possession in the urban context, the feasibility of
its application in California, and the potential utility of the condo-
minium concept to the problem of abandoned urban housing.
I. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Landlord abandonment of housing is a phenomenon currently
plaguing the portion of the United States called Megalopolis,' that ur-
ban triangle bordered by the cities of Boston, Cleveland, and Wash-
ington, D.C. Owners have walked away from over 130,000 apart-
ments and houses in New York City alone during the last four years,"
and it has been estimated that as many homes have been abandoned
during that period as have been destroyed during twenty years of slum
clearance. 4 While rent controls5 may render New York somewhat
1. United Artists (1969) directed by John Schlessinger, taken from J. HERLMIY,
MmNIGHT CowaoY 158 (1965).
2. See D. STOLOFF, TBE NATIONAL SURvEY OF HOUSING ABANDONMENT 1 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as SToLOFF].
3. When Landlords Walk Away, TIME, March 16, 1970, at 88 [hereinafter cited as
TIME]. See, e.g., No Vacancy: Shortage of Housing in New York City Gets Worse
with Every Day: Abandonments, Withdrawal of Capital and an Old Law Exacerbates
City's Crisis, Wall Street J., Dec. 2, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
4. Hollow Shells, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 12, 1970, at 36 [hereinafter cited as NEwswEEK].
This estimate was advanced by Fred Kristoff, Director of Housing Research for the
New York Development Corporation.
5. See N.Y. AD. LAW §§ Y51-1.0 to 18.0 (1963); Comment, Residential Rent
Control in New York City, 3 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 30 (1967).
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unique, the problem is not confined to that city. In 1970, Philadelphia
had 20,000 abandoned apartments and Baltimore more than 5,000
vacant buildings. 6
If this process were one of natural selection, paringout the oldest
and most dilapidated dwellings, it might be defended as an informal
means of building code enforcement. Likewise, the problem of aban-
donment would be minimized if the buildings could be quickly razed,
the residents easily moved to other adequate housing, and ;new apart-
ments promptly constructed on the cleared lots. Such is not the case,
however, and the buildings are often as structurally sound as, and no
older than, most inner-city homes.7  A Baltimore housing official de-
scribed the more usual pattern:
On the first night, the building is looted. With the plumbing gone,
the building is no longer habitable. The next night, or soon, the kids
on dope slide in. Then the neighborhood's apprentice arsonist pays a
visit.8
As time passes, the hulk becomes a "haven for rats, junkies and sun-
dry other derelicts."9  The tragic result is that displaced residents are
forced to find other housing in the constricted ghetto sub-market.10
Although there is no single explanation for the abandonment phe-
nomenon,'1 a recognizable pattern is discernible. One Atlanta land-
lord summarized:
It used to be ... that you could make a fortune in slum housing.
But now the tenants tear up the place as fast as you fix it up. The
6. TIME, supra note 3; L. Downie, Jr., Homes Stand Empty Despite D.C. Housing
Shortage, Washington Post, Mar. 1, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
7. Cf. SToLoFF, supra note 2, at 5-6.
8. TIMWE, supra note 3.
9. Allen, A Frontier Challenge to the Urban Lawyer: Squatters in New York,
49 J. URBAN L. 323, 336 (1971).
10. M. HAnRINGTON, THE OTnER AmRICA 147 (1961).
[fn 1959, for instance, the Mill Creek area of St. Louis was cleared as part of an
urban renewal effort. In the place of a Negro slum there arose a middle income
housing development. Typically, the majority of those evicted were forced to find
housing within the existing, and contracted, Negro ghetto.
Id. See also W. GRISBY, HOUSING MAIKETs AND PuBLic PoLIcy 286 (1963) which
states:
When, as is typically the case, housing in blighted areas is replaced by new homes
for higher-income groups, there is no assurance that the displaced family will be
better or even equally well housed. Their fate hinges on vagaries of the filtering
process, which cannot function effectively when the excess of supply over de-
mand is being diminished rather than increased.
11. For an in depth treatment of abandonment of urban housing wherein the author
contends that rent withholding is a major factor, see Comment, Rent Withholding
Doesn't Work: The Need for a Realistic Rehabilitation Policy, 7 Loy. L.A.L. Ry. 66
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
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city gets on your back and you just can't afford to keep it up. Every
time you fix up a place the insurance and taxes go up. You've got
only two choices-either raise the rent and then the people move out
-or tear it down.' 2
"It used to be . . . that you could make a fortune in slum hous-
ing.""3  Previously, slumlords were large scale operators holding nu-
merous rentals in ghettos. 4  Those days are gone.15 Having depre-
ciated the property and taken their profits, many large scale landlords
have sold their holdings to small investors.' 6 In fact, the National
Urban League's Center for Community Change has described the po-
tential for profit in the ghetto as "[i]ntense but short-lived. 1' 7
"But now the tenants tear up the place as fast as you fix it up."'8
The Urban League refers to these neighborhoods as "crisis ghettos,"'"
areas where social problems are terribly intertwined. In such an area
the apartments are "[t]ypically unmanageable since [they are] located
in a high crime, high vandalism neighborhood with economically un-
stable tenants . ".. .20
"The city gets on your back .... ,21 This declaration may merely
be a perception of more strenuous building code enforcement engen-
dered by the increasing difficulties of slum management. At least
through the mid-sixties, code enforcement was lax in slum areas.22
12. NEwsWEEK, supra note 4.
13. Id.
14. Id. Cf. G. STERNLIEB, RESIDENTIAL ABAaNONMEr: THE ENVIRONMENT OF
DECAY 6 (1972).
15. In low income areas, it has been noted that landlords actually come from
three basic categories: "elderly, small scale absentee, and ethnic minorities." Comment,
supra note 11, at 80, citing G. STERNLIEB, ABANDONMENT AND REHABILITATION, PA-
PERS SUBMITTED TO SUBCOMMITTEE ON Housnao PANELS ON HOUSING PRODUCTION,
OF BANKING AND CURRENCY COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE, HOUSING DEMAND, AND DE-
VELOPING A SUITABLE LIVING ENVIRONMENT, pt. 1, H.R. 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 316
(1971).
16. See NEwSwEEK, supra note 4; cf. Sternlieb, Abandonment and Rehabilitation:
What Is To Be Done?, in HOUSING 62, 64 (G. Sternlieb ed. 1970-1971) [hereinafter cited
as Sternlieb].
17. STOLOFF, supra note 2, at 1.
18. NEWSWEEK, supra note 4. See G. STERNLIEB, RESIDENTIAL A0ANDONMMT:
THE ENVIRONMENT OF DECAY 15 (1972).
19. Housing Abandonment, ARCHITECTUAL F., Apr. 1971, at 42. [hereinafter cited
as ARCH. FORUM].
20. Id.
21. NEWSWEEK, supra note 4.
22. Cf. Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv. 801,
801-02 (1965). The authors conducted interviews with approximately 130 housing
officials in eastera cities.
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Inspectors had difficulty contacting owners when owners of record
were either corporations or out-of-town residents.23 Fictitious names
or chains of title added to the problem.24  When cases finally arrived
in court, judges were often sympathetic to landlords believing that the
tenants would destroy the repairs and that code violations were the
neighborhood norm.25 Only in the late sixties did many cities begin to
insist that ghetto housing comply with the code.26
"[Y]ou just can't afford to keep it up."27 Ironically, the large scale
slumlord was in a better position to make improvements than the small
investor. The small investor often lacks the capital, long term com-
mitment to the property, and economies of scale that his prede-
cessor enjoyed. Having purchased the property with hopes of profit,
the economically less sophisticated owner bears the legacy of years
of neglect, a most unwelcome inheritance. The backlog of improve-
ments needed is so great that a Rand Corporation study estimated
costs of maintenance in slum housing at $24 per room per month.28
On both an individual and group level, actual abandonment is pre-
ceded by a loss of mental commitment. A study of slum landlords in
eastern cities, indicated that owners psychologically abandon prop-
erty long before they shut off the services vital to the life of the build-
ing.29 For example, when a neighborhood suffers a three to six per-
cent abandonment rate, there is an ostensible collective shrug of resig-
nation followed by a wave of further abandonments.3 0
When landlords shut off the utilities and make no effort to collect
23. Id. at 813.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 822-23.
26. See NEWSWEEK, supra note 4. It has been argued that housing codes have
not in fact been enforced because of the cost of rehabilitation (Grigsby, Economic
Aspects of Housing Code Enforcement, 3 URBAN LAw. 533, 537 (1971) ), and
that when they have, only minimal fines have been imposed, thus rendering enforce-
ment inefficacious. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDNG TIM
AMERICAN Crny, H.R. Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., lst Sess. 287 (1968). See also
Comment, supra note 11, at 68. To a landlord, however, even a minimal fine may
be perceived as "the city getting on your back."
27. NEWswEm, supra note 4. See G. STERNLIEB, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT:
THE ENVIRONMENT OF DECAY 6 (1972).
28. NEWSwEEK, supra note 4. See also G. Sternlieb, ABANDONMENT AND REHABIU-
TATION, PAPERS SUBMITTrED TO SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING PANELS ON HOUSING PRO-
DUCTION OF BANKING AND CURRENCY COMmTEE OF THE HOUSE, HOUSING DEMAND,
AND DEVELOPING A SUITABLE IJVING ENVIRONMENT, pt. 1, H.R. 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
318 (1971).
29. STOLOFF, supra note 2, at 16.
30. See Acnm FoRuM, supra note 19, at 45.
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rent, tenants without a lease have no recourse but to move.81 After
the taxes on the building remain unpaid for a statutorily defined pe-
riod, the land is "sold" to the state subject to a redemption upon pay-
ment of the money due. 2 This right of redemption is lost at the end
of a statutorily defined period whereupon the state assumes ownership
of the property.3s
I-. ADVERSE POSSESSION AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
Concern with the problem of abandonment has generated numerous
suggestions.3 4  Significantly, two elements are common to this plethora
of proposals.
31. Cf. STOLOiFI, supra note 2, at 6. For a brief discussion of the possibility
of suing for damages for breach of contract, see Comment, supra note 11, at 71.
32. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE ANN. § 3352 (West 1970) provides in part:
The notice shall be in the form of an affidavit and shall show: (a) That unless
the total amount due is paid, the real property on which the total amount due is
a lien will be sold to the state. . . . (c) . . . the real property may be redeemed by
payment of the amount of sold taxes together with such additional penalties and
fees as prescribed by law ...
(emphasis added).
33. Id. § 3362(f). The statutorily defined period is now fixed at five years. Id.
§ 3511.
34. Initially, it has been advanced that an infusion of money is needed because
both landlords and tenants often lack the financial resources to restore buildings
to an acceptable building code level. See Sternlieb, supra note 16, at 66. See also
Comment, supra note 11, at 90.
A complementary suggestion is that building codes are unrealistically demanding
for poor areas and that standards should be lowered to avert abandonment. Stem-
lieb, supra note 16, at 66. Cities could be divided into zones and enforcement of
codes could be dependent on the zone. This would alleviate the pressure to abandon
housing that is basically sound but unable to meet the demands of current building
codes. See generally G. Barnhart, Powers and Procedures for Ordering Repair
and. Demolition of Existing Buildings, in URBAN LAND USE POLICY 141 (R. Andrews
ed. 1972).
At one time the paramount suggestion would have been to plow under the empty
hulks and erect public housing. See R. LINESBERRY & I. SHASKANSKY, URBAN POLMCS
AND PUBLIc POLicY 326 (1971).
Some of the sluggish growth of public housing has resulted from the rude facts of
political power. Such housing has its proponents, but it also has a formidable ar-
ray of opponents.. . . Recently public housing has suffered a further challenge
the "disillusionment of the experts." "The cause of public housing . . . . has
been psychologically abandoned by many of its former supporters. In the past ten
years, assessment of public housing has been more and more negative." Catherine
Bauer has claimed that the program has reached a "dreary deadlock," that it is
strong enough to survive in the incremental budgeting process but too weak to
counter emasculation by its critics.
Id., quoting L. FREEDmAN, PUBLIC HOusING 191 (1969). Even if one were willing to
posit that the city would be a better landlord than a private owner, urban renewal
has a most unwelcome side effect. Owners of abutting buildings often discontinue
all but the most minimal services to their tenants in the belief that the city will soon
buy their building for renewal, thus creating a domino effect lowering the quality of
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One element is the use of government regulatory tools to provide
subsidies to the current owners either in the form of direct payments
or manipulation of the tax structure. The other ingredient is the in-
stallation of the government as the landlord of last resort, thereby
allowing it to serve as landlord of all abandoned buildings.
The underlying assumption of both these approaches is that owner-
ship should remain in the hands of someone other than the tenant.
This is by no means an unassailable premise. Cities in the past have
exhibited a pronounced inability to conduct massive renewal through
renovation. 5 Furthermore, it is unlikely that current owners are en-
thusiastic about remaining since profits are marginal and management
is difficult 6 In light of these difficulties, a new approach merits dis-
cuss on.
]l-. ADVERSE POSSESSION OF ABANDONED BUILDINGS
UNDER CALIFORNIA LAw
California cities have been fortunate in that there have not been
mass abandonments on the scale of eastern cities.37 The problem to
date is of manageable dimension, yet the time to formulate policy is
before the problem has grown to grand proportions.38
housing. Cf. Sternlieb, supra note 16, at 62; G. STERNLmB, THE TENEMENT LAND-
Loiw 164 (1966).
For a good discussion of alternative approaches to resolving the problem of aban-
donment see also STOLOFF, supra note 1.
35. See E. BANFLD, THE UNHEAVENLY Ciry 40-41 (1968).
The owners of the brownstone buildings in these blocks were given the choice of
either bringing their buildings up to a high standard or selling them to someone-
either a private purchaser or the City-who would. In May 1960, the letters to
the owners went out. Nearly ten years later (September 1969) the City had
bought eighteen of the buildings. Four of them were offered for sale to qualified
bidders at auction in 1963, but only one was bid upon and that by only one bid-
der. In 1965, the City announced that it had arranged negotiated sales to eighteen"sponsors" who would rehabilitate the buildings and create a racially integrated
neighborhood. The sponsors would pay from $21,000 to $34,000 for the build-
ings, which was about 10 percent less than their estimated market value. Since
they were in very poor condition ("nothing but four walls," said Mrs. Kenneth
Clark, who with her husband was one of the sponsors), rehabilitation costs would
be high-about $15,000 per floor . . . and the City was hoping to sell the re-
maining buildings at about 50 percent of their current market value.
Id.
36. See ARcH. FoRUM, supra note 19, at 42.
37. Interview with land assessor Rodney Madsen, Imperial Savings and Loan, Tor-
rence, California, Apr. 26, 1973.
38. Sternleb, supra note 16, at 76. Mr. Sternlieb stated:
I cannot stress too strongly here that we must broaden the state of the art- The
phenomenon of abandonment is not a transient [one]. It will deepen and in-
crease. What will be required to deal with it are a whole armory of weapons
and they must be developed. Abandonment is an: immediate emergency, and it
should not be forgotten, but that emergency will be with us for many years. Un-
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A. "Abandonment" under California Law
The discussion thus far has been of the social problem of urban
abandonment. In this context, abandonment might be defined as a
process of disengagement, culminating "[w]hen a landlord no longer
provides services to an occupied building, or pays taxes and mort-
gages." 9 The generic definition of "abandonment" used by California
courts would appear to coincide with this meaning. In Lawrence v.
Fulton,40 the California supreme court defined "abandonment" as the
"voluntary surrender and giving up of the thing by the owner because
he no longer desires to possess it, or thereafter to assert any right or
dominion over it."
4"
In contrast, however, two early cases established that land in fee can
not be considered "abandoned."
In Ferris v. Coover,42 the court held that:
The doctrine of abandonment only applies where there has been a
mere naked possession without title. . . . Where there is title, to
preserve it there need be no continuance of possession, and the aban-
donment of the latter can not affect the rights held by virtue of the
former.
4
3
Thus abandonment would exist only where one adverse possessor vol-
untarily left the land against which he was claiming.
Eight years later in an ejectment case, the court reiterated this view,
"[A]s a title in fee, neither abandonment or [sic] disclaimer has any appli-
cation to or effect upon such title or the right to the possession flowing
therefrom. 44
These cases have not been overruled, yet they need not be consid-
ered determinative. The term "abandonment," as used in California
law, developed during the formative years of a rural state. The cur-
rent problem could hardly have been within the contemplation of the
judges who considered whether a fee owner had an obligation to ex-
ercise dominion over his rural pastures.
less we make the investment in securing added know-how now, we will be no
better equipped in the future than we are presently.
Id.
39. ARCH. FORUM, supra note 19, at 42.
40. 19 Cal. 683 (1862).
41. Id. at 690-91.
42. 10 Cal. 589 (1858).
43. Id. at 631.
44. Davis v. Perley, 30 Cal. 630, 636 (1866).
[Vol. 7
ADVERSE POSSESSION
B. The Government. . .Owner of Last Resort
Regardless of a landlord's intent to "abandon," failure to pay taxes
will eventually result in the state becoming owner by default. The
California Revenue and Taxation Code provides an orderly procedure.
On or before each June 8, the county tax collector publishes a list of
property on which taxes have not been paid for the year.4r An affi-
davit is then sent by him as notice: (1) that unless all taxes are paid,
the property will be sold to the state; (2) of the time and place that
the property will be sold to the state; (3) that if the propery is sold,
it can be redeemed by payment of the taxes due; (4) that unless re-
deemed, the property can be sold at public auction or otherwise con-
veyed.
46
If the taxes remain unpaid by June 30, a curious non-event occurs.
The land is declared "sold" to the state "by operation of law and the
declaration of the tax collector."47 Despite the statutory language about
sale, the landowner has five years in which to redeem his property by
payment of back taxes to the government.48
The question naturally arises as to the nature of the legal status of
the title to the land during the five year redemption period. The de-
linquent owner is not free to convey the land, for it is tax-deeded prop-
erty,49 but legal title still rests in his hands. The California supreme
court has held that "[t]he 'sale' which occurs . . . starts the running
of the five-year period at the expiration of which the state may acquire
legal title. ' 50
Thus, during the five year period, the property resides in a legal
netherland. If the landlord has an undisputed possessory right to the
estate, then the statute of limitations will not toll. 1 It should be noted
45. CAL. Rnv. & TAX. CODE ANN. § 3351 (West 1970).
46. Id. § 3352.
47. Id. § 3436.
48. Id. § 3511.
49. Id. § 127 which provides:
'Tax-deeded property" is property which has been deeded to the State for taxes
and which has not been sold to a private purchaser or a taxing agency, or to an
administering agency after being classified for public use, and has not been re-
deemed.
50. Weston Inv. Co. v. State, 31 Cal. 2d 391, 393, 189 P.2d 262, 264 (1948);
accord, Ducey v. Dambacher, 27 Cal. App. 2d 658, 662, 81 P.2d 597, 599 (1938).
51. See Franz v. Mendonca, 131 Cal. 205, 208-09 (1900); Lawrence v. Webster, 44
Cal. 385, 388 (1872); Potrero Nuevo Land Co. v. All Persons, 29 Cal. App. 743,
753, 156 P. 876, 880 (1916); CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 326 (West 1970):
When the relation of landlord and tenant has existed between any persons, the
possession of the tenant is deemed the possession of the landlord until the expira-
tion of five years from the termination of the tenancy, or, where there has been
1974]
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that the statutory language draws no distinction between continuing
tenants paying rent and tenants at sufferance. 52  One might argue that
the status of landlord and tenant ended when the landlord shut off
services and ceased collecting rent. 3  Consequently, the occupant
would no longer be a tenant and would be free from the restrictions
against adverse possession by tenants.
While extensive revision of the Revenue and Taxation Code would
be required to distinguish the state of the title in abandonment from
mere tax deliquency, it might be more advantageous to promote ad-
verse possession against the government rather than against the land-
lord. Despite the present language of the code,5 4 it is the govern-
ment rather than the abandoning landlord who has an enduring inter-
est in the building. The landlord no longer cares enough to provide
rudimentory services to the tenants, maintain his property, or even pay
taxes. The landlord is relinquishing his title, and the government will
become the eventual owner.
At common law and in most jurisdictions in this country, no right
to adversely possess against the government has existed." Government
exemption from the laws of adverse possession may be traced to Hob-
besian thought. In Leviathan,58 Hobbes wrote that men ceded all
of their rights to the sovereign and that they gained social order in re-
turn:
And because they are essential and [inseparable] rights, it follows
necessarily, that in whatsoever words any of them seem to be granted
away, yet if the sovereign power itself be not in direct terms re-
no written lease, until the expiration of five years from the time of the last payment
of rent, notwithstanding that such tenant may have acquired another title, or may
have claimed to hold adversely to his landlord. But such presumptions cannot be
made after the periods herein limited.
52. See CAL. CODE CIv. PRO. § 326 (West 1970).
53. The reason for the rule against adverse possession may be summed up by
the maxim: "If the possession is consistent with or in subordination to the title
of the real owner, it is not adverse." Mills v. Laing, 38 Cal. App. 776, 779, 177
P. 493, 494 (1918). The tenant paying his monthly rent is giving no notice of
his hostility or claim of right. C. CAL rzA. r, ADVERSE POSSESSION 67 (1961). When
the landlord-tenant relationship is severed by removal of all services and no further
collections of rent, the presumption of subordination could be removed. Note, how-
ever, that California precludes the development of this position through statutory lan-
guage in circumstances "where there has been no written lease, until the expiration of
five years from the time of the last payment of rent .... " CAL. CODE CIV. PRO.
§ 326 (West 1970).
54. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE ANN. § 3362 (West 1970).
55. See Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 554, 559-63 (1957).
56. T. HOBBEs, LEvrATHAN 30 (Collier Bks. ed. 1962).
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nounced, and the name of sovereign no more given by the grantees of
him that grants them, the grant is void .... 5*
This philosophy, hallowed in most jurisdictions, was pungently ex-
pressed in Ralston v. Weston.
58
Every law-abiding citizen, who loves, respects, and cherishes the insti-
tutions of his country, is charged with the patriotic duty, through fealty
to the people, to preserve all public rights intact. If there are those
whose sentiment of public obligation is so weak as to cause them,
through their promptings of private gain, to become exploiters of public
rights, they should find no countenance in the decisions of the courts.
The law can never be made the instrument of its own destruction in
the hands of lawbreakers, nor should it afford protection where alle-
giance is wanting.59
California views the problem differently.60 In People v. Kerber,61
the California supreme court stated:
It is true that the public may, by some lawful act of public authority,
be discontinued or abandoned and that, in that event, the property may
thereupon cease to be protected by this rule [no adverse possession
against the government]. If the title is at that time held by the state,
it will thereafter hold it as proprietor and not as a public agent or
sovereign in charge of public use. If an adverse possession can be
maintained, or if the statute of limitations can run against the state,
in regard to proprietary property, it will begin from the date when
the public use ceased and not before. If the power is left to the leg-
islature, it may then provide for the sale of such property in order
that it may become the subject of private ownership.62
57. Id.
58. 33 S.E. 326 (W. Va. 1899). In that case, plaintiff's land abutted a public street.
The street was in a small town and had never been graded, curbed, and paved, as the
work would have involved great labor and expense, and public needs did not seem
to require it. Plaintiff claimed a right to the street by adverse possession. In rejecting
this claim, the judge stated that if the plaintiffs right were upheld, "[s]uch sovereignty
would be as helpless as Gulliver when staked to the ground by Lilliputians with
hairs from his own head." Id. at 330.
59. Id.
60. One may not adversely possess against the government whenever the property
is "dedicated to a public use by a public utility, or dedicated to or owned by the
state or any public entity... "' CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007 (West Supp. 1973).
Where there has been no public use or dedication, the state may pursue no remedy
after a ten year period. CAL. CODE CIv. PRO. § 315 (West 1970).
The relevant question then becomes-when is land not invested with a public trust?
Case law provides few clues.
61. 152 Cal. 731 (1908).
62. Id. at 734-35.
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This widely noted case, 63 by itself, provides little illumination. It
has been employed as a talisman in later cases, most frequently to in-
troduce what is not proprietary property. Thus, there developed a defi-
nition by exclusion. Land held by the state for public squares is in-
vested with a public trust.64 Property held by a housing agency em-
braces a public trust.65 A ritual nod to Kerber has found public dedi-
cation in land owned by school districts66 as well as flood control dis-
tricts.
67
Where the state attempts to sell the land, its function has been con-
sidered merely proprietary just as that of any other private landowner.
6
In the leading case, Henry Cowell Lime & Cement Co. v. State,69 the
state donated land to a city for business and commercial use. The city
sold the land to plaintiff's business. Due to irregularities in the pro-
ceedings prior to the sale, the tax deed was declared void. 0 Despite
this development, the plaintiff continued to possess, adversely. The
supreme court held that, under the circumstances, the land only be-
longed to the state in a proprietary sense.71 When the state acted in
a sovereign capacity, it could employ the prerogatives of the sovereign;
but when the state acted to protect land that it wished to sell, then
the state came before the court with no greater rights than any other
corporate entity.
In a real sense, the state holds abandoned apartments in a proprie-
tary capacity. The landlord may repurchase the land from the state
for the price of his back taxes plus the added penalty. 2 If not, the
63. Cf., e.g., People v. Chambers, 37 Cal. 2d 552, 556-57, 233 P.2d 557, 560 (1951);
City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co., 209 Cal. 105, 136, 287 P. 475, 490 (1930);
City of Los Angeles v. Anderson, 206 Cal. 662, 668, 275 P. 789, 791 (1929);
Humboldt County v. Van Duzer, 48 Cal. App. 640, 643, 192 P. 192, 194 (1920).
64. Richert v. City of San Diego, 109 Cal. App. 548, 553, 293 P. 673, 676 (1930).
65. Manwell v. Public Housing Admin., 165 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
66. Howard v. Orovile School Dist., 22 Cal. App. 544, 551, 135 P. 689, 692
(1913).
67. Fresno Irrigation Dist. v. Smith, 58 Cal. App. 2d 48, 59, 136 P.2d 382, 388
(1943).
68. Henry Cowell Lime & Cement Co. v. State, 18 Cal. 2d 169, 172, 114 P.2d
331, 332 (1941).
69. 18 Cal. 2d 169, 114 P.2d 331 (1941).
70. Id. at 170, 114 P.2d at 332, citing, e.g., Pimental v. City of San Francisco, 21
Cal. 351, 360 (1863).
71. 18 Cal. 2d at 172, 114 P.2d at 332.
72. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE ANN. § 3352(c) (West 1970). The penalties imposed
are also delineated in the code. "All taxes due November 1st, if unpaid, are delin-
quent December 10th at 5 p.m. and thereafter a delinquent penalty of 6 percent
attaches to them." Id. § 2704. "The second half of taxes on the secured roll,
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state may sell the land to someone else at the termination of the five
year period.
73
One may legitimately ask whether the state should make such a
sale. Assuming the building has been stripped of its plumbing and
gutted by vandals, it will be of little use to speculators as a building.
Investors would be paying solely for the potential future value of the
land. Needless to say, prospective tenants would find little value in
such a building either. Even if the building had not been vandalized
and the tenants had remained, the speculator might have purchased
merely with the hope that land value in the area would increase. In
that case, the new owner would again be one who was disinterested
in the continued habitability of the building. Given the constrictions
of the ghetto housing market, 74 would not the land be put to bet-
ter use as a dwelling than as the repository of some uncertain, future,
speculative value? Lastly, if the party were to purchase with hopes
of renovation, he would become heir to the insuperable difficulties ex-
perienced by cities and other outside parties. 75  Perhaps, as an alter-
native, the concept of individual home ownership could give rise to a
more permanent and effective use of the land.
C. Adverse Possession
The preconditions for adverse possession are settled in California. 7
Initially, California law requires that adverse possession be hostile.77
This requirement does not necessarily mean that there must be enmity
between the parties. The hostility as such merely means that the pos-
sessor holds adversely to the record holder's rights, either express or
implied.78  Conceptually, the urban adverse possessor would hold his
claim in contravention of the state's right to sell the land. The fact
that the state did not exercise that right would not necessarily mean that
the use would be permissive.79 The claim is based on hostility to a
right; it is not dependent on an exercise of that right.
if unpaid, is delinquent April 10th at 5 p.m. and thereafter a delinquent penalty
of 6 percent attaches to it." Id. § 2705.
73. Cf. id. § 3362(b).
74. See note 10 supra.
75. See note 35 supra.
76. See Laubish v. Roberdo, 43 Cal. 2d 702, 706, 277 P.2d 9, 12 (1954); West
v. Evans, 29 Cal. 2d 414, 417, 175 P.2d 219, 220 (1946); Harvey v. Nurick, 268
Cal. App. 2d 213, 214-15, 74 Cal. Rptr. 94, 96 (1968).
77. Ross v. Burkhard Inv. Co., 90 Cal. App. 201, 211, 265 P. 982, 986 (1928);
Huling v. Seccombe, 88 Cal. App. 238, 243-44, 263 P. 362, 364 (1928).
78. Fugl v. Edwards, 96 Cal. App. 2d 460, 464, 215 P.2d 802, 804 (1950).
79. Permissive use is characterized in California as "a license exercised in subordi-
19741
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
A second element of adverse possession is that the claimant must
possess the property exclusively. s0 In the context of urban housing,
possession could not be exclusive in the sense of one person claiming
the entire building. Each occupant would exclusively claim his own
dwelling.
Theoretically, the arrangement would parallel a condominium."
Condominium dwellers generally own in fee, "the interior surfaces of
the perimeter walls, floors, ceilings, windows, and doors thereof, and
the unit includ[ing] both the portions of the building so described and
the airspace so encompassed. '" 82  Ownership of the common areas
is held in equal shares, one for each unit."' In addition, each resident
has a nonexclusive easement of ingress and egress and support. 4  Each
adverse possessor would occupy a horizontal plane of space, the param-
eters of which would be defined by vertical planes (walls) intersect-
ing the horizontal plane.
A difficulty arises, however, in deciding the rights to the land under
the building. Generally, condominium residents control disposal of
their property through the condominium association. Each member
has an equal voice s5 One might argue that the adverse possessors
could become tenants in common of an undivided 1/nth portion of
the land,8 6 with "n" representing either the number of dwellings in
nation to .. . [the owner's] claim." Alper v. Tormey, 7 Cal. App. 8, 11, 93 P. 402,
404 (1907). In Davis v. Martin, 157 Cal. 657, 108 P. 866 (1910), an action involving
water rights, the California supreme court analyzed one type of conduct as indicative
of permissive use:
It appears, however, that application. . . [for the water] was always made to the
owners of the Martin Ranch when they were using the water at the time, that
sometimes the plaintiffs were refused any part of the water, and from all the evi-
dence it is a fair inference that the plaintiffs and their predecessor always recog-
nized the superior right of the Martins to the water and yielded to their wishes.
Id. at 662, 108 P. at 868. Tenants need not explicitly exhibit such deferential conduct
and the lack of aggressively antagonistic character does not prevent the claim from
being hostile. See Ortiz v. Pacific States Properties, 96 Cal. App. 2d 34, 37, 215 P.2d
514, 516 (1950).
80. See, e.g., Straux v. Canty, 169 Cal. 101, 105 (1915).
81. CAL. Civ. CODE § 783 (West 1970): "A condominium is an estate in real
property consisting of an undivided interest in common in a portion of a parcel
of real estate together with a separate interest in space in a residential . . . building
on such real property. .. ." (emphasis added).
82. CAL. Cim. CODE § 1353 (West 1970).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Comment, Fee in Condominium, 37 S. CAL. L. REv. 82, 87-88 (1964).
86. By analogy, for example, condominium owners own "an undivided interest
in common in a portion of a parcel of real property." CAL. CIV. CoDE § 783 (West
1970). The land can be considered a common area.
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the building or the proportion of the total floor space taken up by the
occupant's home.
California provides no mechanism by which the stealthy entrant can
acquire a possessory interest in propertyY7  Instead, adverse posses-
sion must be "open" so that an owner might discover his presence.88
The building would have to serve as a home rather than just an occa-
sional dwelling. Consequently, the tenant's commitment to the build-
ing would have to be quite serious since a substantial amount of main-
tenance and repair would ordinarily be required. Note, however, that
tenants would not have to proclaim their presence and intent because
the landlord is put on notice by the fact of their continuous presence.89
Finally, California requires that the adverse possessor pay all taxes
levied and assessed on the land that he wishes to claim. 0 Historically,
this requirement is traceable to the railroad influence on early Cali-
fornia government.91 The railroad was interested in gaining early no-
tice of squatters on their large tracts of undeveloped land.92 Of the
fifteen states requiring payment of taxes, eight are western states where
the owners of substantial acreage found it impractical and virtually im-
possible to discover potential adverse takers by mere visual inspection
of their vast possessions. 93
87. See Cave v. Crafts, 53 Cal. 135, 138 (1878); Klein v. Caswell, 88 Cal. App.
2d 774, 779, 199 P.2d 689, 692 (1948). In Klein the court stated:
The possession required by the statutes and by the decisions is one that must be
so open, notorious and continuous as to give notice to others that it is hostile to
the record owner and must be such as to indicate a claim of right, at least to the
extent of putting a prudent man upon inquiry. "It must, in other words, be an
open, unequivocal, actual possession-notorious, apparent, uninterrupted and ex-
clusive-carrying with it marks and evidences of ownership, which apply in or-
dinary cases to the possession of real property."
Id., quoting Lofstead v. Murasky, 152 Cal. 64, 69, 91 P. 1008, 1010 (1907).
88. Cave v. Crafts, 53 Cal. 135, 138 (1878); Klein v. Caswell, 88 Cal. App. 2d
774, 779, 199 P.2d 689, 692 (1948).
89. Shelton v. Malette, 144 Cal. App. 2d 370, 376, 301 P.2d 18, 22 (1956). See
also CAL. CIrv. CODE § 19 (West 1970):
Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent
man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, has constructive notice of the fact itself
in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he might have learned such
fact.
90. CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 325 (West 1970). That the payment of taxes serves
as a form of notice to the record owner is not clearly a purpose of the statute,
nor is a definitional alternative purpose apparent from its face. See Comment, Real
Property: Payment of Taxes By an Adverse Possessor, 20 CALiF. L. Rnv. 432, 433
(1932). Defenders of the tax payment requirement, however, have proffered notice
as a basis of support for their position. See Comment, The Payment of Taxes Re-
quirement in Adverse Possession Statutes, 37 CALiF. L. REv. 477, 479 (1949).
91. Comment, Payment of Taxes as a Condition of Title by Adverse Possession: A
Nineteenth Century Anachronism, 10 SANTA CLARA. LAw. 244, 245-49 (1969).
92. Id. at 249.
93. Id. at 253.
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In the context of urban adverse possession, the tax requirement may
be eliminated while still remaining true to the exigency that prompted
its institution. Notice to the prior owner is irrelevant when the prior
owner has made the decision to relinquish his property. One is not
dealing with vast uncharted lands where the state could discover the
presence of squatters only through taxation. Instead, the state should
be consciously formulating a policy of home ownership.94  Taxation
should not be an artificial impediment to this result. Furthermore,
the tax requirement in this context is not merely unnecessary, it is posi-
tively harmful. 95 The same taxes that contributed to the landlord's
ouster, would bar poor city dwellers from exercising a claim.
One must question the utility of a modem state demanding tax
money from these people. It should not require too great a leap of
faith to accept the proposition that a considerable number of the people
forced to live in such housing are poor. If they are poor, then the
94. There may be some overlap between the concept of adverse possession as applied
to abandoned dwellings and the concept of homesteading. At least one popular article
has used the term homesteading for what is essentially adverse possession. G. Bron-
son, The Old Homestead, Wall Street J., Sept. 21, 1973, at 1, col. 1. (The Federal
Homestead Act provided that settlers could stake a claim not to exceed 160 acres,
on unappropriated federal lands. 43 U.S.C. § 161 (1970). "Every person who
is the head of a family, or has arrived at the age of 21 years, and is a citizen
of the United States . . . shall be entitled to enter one-quarter section, or less quan-
tity, of unappropriated public lands, to be located in a body in conformity to the
legal subdivisions of the public lands; but no person who is the proprietor of more
than one hundred and sixty acres of the land in any State or Territory, shall acquire
any right under the homestead law. And every person owning and residing on land
may, under the provisions of this section, enter other land lying contiguous to his
land, which shall not, with the land so already owned and occupied, exceed in the
aggregate one hundred and sixty acres.")
The claimant must file an affidavit stating that the application is made for him-
self and not someone else, that he is not acting as agent for another party, that
he will make a good-faith effort to comply with the law, and that he has paid
the required fee ($5 for less than eighty acres, $10 for more than eighty acres). Id.
§ 162. Three years later, the homesteader, or his wife or devisee if he is deceased, is
entitled to a patent to the land. Id. § 164.
While the position taken in this Comment recommends the application of adverse
possession to the urban market, the Federal Homestead Act could also serve as
a model for legislation. A too literal reproduction of the act should be avoided. For
example, the Supreme Court has held that lands within the limits of towns or muni-
cipalities are excluded from homestead entry. Burfening v. Chicago, 163 U.S. 321,
322, 324 (1896).
95. The ensuing result is that money which could be used to renovate individual
dwelling spaces instead is diverted to the government in the form of taxes. Further-
more, this tax requirement may render adverse possession prohibitive for low income
residents who would be most likely to utilize it. Note, however, that since the
claimants will no longer be paying rent, the requirement of payment of 1/nth of
the taxes per year may still be less than one year's rent to the previous landlord.
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state would be drawing funds from the most economically vulnerable
group in society. If they are on welfare, then the county would only
be transferring funds from welfare payments to tax payments.
IV. STATUTORY ALTERNATIVES
Presently, adverse possession of abandoned urban housing is an in-
choate concept in California law. Thus far, cases and statutes have
been utilized to suggest a base upon which the idea might grow. Ex-
tensive legislation will be necessary, however, in order for the idea
to take practical effect. Such legislation necessarily must answer ques-
tions such as: who is to be the title holder against whom the property
will be adversely possessed; what organizational scheme is necessary to
manage the privately owned dwellings; how is tort liability to be de-
termined; how will landlord eviction be curtailed; and finally, will the
governmental cost be prohibitive? These problems and possible legis-
lative solutions must be examined.
A. The Government as Title Holder
Currently, property owners may redeem their property by payment
of delinquent taxes prior to the expiration of five years.9" Only at
that time does the state become the title holder of the property. Con-
sequently, if a claimant is to obtain a dwelling space by adverse pos-
session, under cu rrent law he would be adversely possessing against
the state only upon the termination of the five year period. Prior to
that time, possession would be hostile only to the interests of the previ-
ous landlord who continues to hold legal title; even that hostility is
currently not recognized.97 Assuming that the government's interest
is merely proprietary (thus rendering it conducive to adverse posses-
sion9 8), to implement such an adverse possession scheme, legislation
must be enacted to enable the state to become the holder of record
prior to the expiration of the five year period. 99 If a landlord has
irrevocably abandoned the property, there is no harm in installing the
state as owner in fee. On the other hand, if the landowner has made
96. CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE ANN. § 332 (West 1970).
97. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
98. See text accompanying notes 55-75 supra.
99. The alternative to this would be legislation allowing adverse possession against
a landlord who has "abandoned" his property, and allowing taking when the gov-
ernment subsequently becomes title holder. Either alternative would suffice and the
problems involved are quite similar, i.e., determining true abandonment, redemption,
etc.
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a business decision to leave the building unoccupied in the hope of
selling it, or as a prelude to destruction and erection of another build-
ing, then installation of the state as owner would be a bold usurpa-
tion.
Therein lies the rub: to draft legislation limiting swift government
takeover only to truly abandoned buildings. The Urban League has
pinpointed the two criteria for abandonment that would be vital to such
legislation: (1) discontinuation of services and (2) failure to pay
taxes.10 Since the county tax collector currently must prepare a list
of tax delinquent property,1 1 it would seem appropriate that he also
prepare a list of that property which meet these criteria.
In addition, since the tax collector presently must publish an affi-
davit of "sale' to the government, 0 2 he could also be required to pub-
lish affidavits which might include the following statements:
(1) Taxes are delinquent on the property;
(2) The land has been classified as abandoned based on:
(a) Discontinuation of services to the building;
(b) Failure to pay taxes;
(3) As abandoned property, it is subject to irrevocable forfeiture by
-(a short statutorily determined period);
(4) The landowner may:
(a) Contest the classification of the property as abandoned
by requesting an administrative hearing;
(b) Contest the classification of the property by injunctive
suit;
(c) Contest the delinquency of the taxes.
Even assuming the efficacy of this accelerated title transfer, Cali-
fornia currently demands a ten year adverse possession against the
government. This figure would surely be a prohibitive one to low
income tenants in this mobile society and should be substantially re-
duced.10 3
100. STOLOFF, supra note 2, at 3.
101. CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE ANN. § 3351 (West 1970).
102. Id. § 3362.
103. The Federal residency requirement for homesteading, for instance, is five years.
43 U.S.C. § 164 (1970). Also, in a recent scheme implemented in Detroit utilizing
the concept of homesteading abandoned urban housing, the required period is five
years. L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1973, § 1-A, at 3, col. 5. For discussion of homesteading
see note 94 supra.
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B. Does the Condominium Concept Offer
An Organizational Solution?"
If legislation is adopted enabling low income families to adversely
possess abandoned urban housing, the problem of how to implement
104. With rising population, increasing density in smaller concentrations of land,
and diminishing availability in land supply, today's condominium housing is a viable
form of home ownership. 4A R. PowEL., REAL PROPERTY § 633.32 (1968) [hereinaf-
ter cited as POWELL]; 1 P. RoHAN & M. RESKN, CONDOMnIm LAW AND PRACTmCE
§ 10A.01 (1972) [hereinafter cited as RoHN & REs~mN]; Alpren & Hassenfeld,
Condominium; A Functional Freehold in the Metropolis, 5 AM. Bus. L.J. 127 (1967);
Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 987,
1024 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Berger, Condominium Shelter]; Schreiber, The Lat-
eral Housing Development: Condominium or Home Owners Association, 117 U. PA.
L. REv. 1104 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Schreiber]. Although the condominium
has existed since ancient times in various parts of the world (1 A. FERRER & K.
STECHER, LAw OF CONDOMIUM 14-81 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PERER &
STECHER]; POWELL, supra, § 633.1), the initial spark for its wide acceptance in the
United States began with the 1961 amendment of the National Housing Act, authoriz-
ing the Federal Housing Administration to insure mortgages on condominium units.
National Housing Act § 234, 75 Stat. 180 (1961); 12 U.S.C. § 1715y (1970).
It was amended in 1964 to insure mortgages for financing construction and re-
habilitation of condominiums. Harrison, The FHA Condominium: Use as a Means
of Meeting the Need for Moderate Income Housing, 11 N.Y.L.F. 458 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as FHA Condominium]. More recently, the Veteran Housing Act of 1970, 38
U.S.C. § 1810, provided condominium loan insurance for veterans.
This amendment to the National Housing Act was part of a trend sparked by
the National Housing Act, originally enacted in 1934, to meet the needs of expand-
ing urban population and to encourage improvement in housing standards. Implemen-
tation of these goals was provided by establishing a mortgage and loan insurance
system administered by the FHA. With the FHA as insurer, lending institutions
became more willing to give loans to individuals. Insuring condominium ownership
followed the trend of insuring loans on other types of housing, such as cooperative
housing (§ 213) and nursing homes (§ 232). Welfeld, The Condominium and Med-
ian-Income Housing, 31 FoRDBAM L. REV. 457, 475 (1963).
The FHA recommended that states pass enabling legislation to implement the mort-
gage insurance program on condominiums, and it drafted a Model Statute for Crea-
tion of Apartment Ownership as a guide. FERRER & STECHER, supra §§ 2, 4. In
the past decade, condominium legislation was passed in every state and the District
of Columbia, generally following the Model Statute. Currently, condominium projects
have been mushrooming throughout the United States. Buhan, A Lawyer Looks at Resi-
dential Condominiums, 7 A.B.A. REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 7, 19 (1972); Note,
Florida Condominiums-Developer Abuses and Securities Law Implications Create a
Need for State Regulatory Agency, 25 U. FIA. L. Ruv. 350, 351 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Florida Condominiums].
In combining the concepts of adverse possession and condominium structure, theo-
retically the problems of financing are avoided. Adverse possessors need not finance
their claim because they are not in fact purchasing it. For a discussion of the
problems of financing condominium purchases by low income families see Quirk,
Wein & Gomberg, A Draft Program of Housing Reform: The Tenant Condominium,
53 CORNELL L. Rnv. 361, 373-90 (1968); Comment, Condominiums and the 1968
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such a scheme becomes of immediate concern. While the legal mech-
anism for transferring title to the state and ultimately to the adverse
possessor has been examined and dealt with, the practical problems of
day to day living-management of common areas, application for mail
and utility services, and dwelling repair-require extensive exploration.
The analogy to condominiums, as used previously, may provide a po-
tential solution to this problematic living arrangement.
Condominium is generally defined as "a system of separate owner-
ship of individual units in multiple-unit buildings."10 5 Each unit is
owned individually in fee simple thus rendering its utilization conducive
to the adverse possession scheme. There are two types of common
areas: the general which is used by all the owners, such as the hall-
ways, and the limited, which is used only by a specific owner, such as
a parking space.10 The common areas, also called the common ele-
ments, are owned by all the unit owners as tenants in common. 107 This
Housing and Urban Development Act: Putting the Poor in Their Place, 43 S. CAL. L.
REv. 309, 317-28 (1970).
105. Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 251 N.Y.S.2d 321, 327 (Civ. Ct. City N.Y.
1964); POWELL, supra note 104, § 633.1(2); ROHAN & RESUN, supra note 104, § 1.01.
A more elaborate definition is:
[The] condominium is a multi-unit dwelling each of whose residents enjoys ex-
clusive ownership of his individual apartment. With "title" to an apartment goes
a cotenant's undivided interest in the common facilities- the land, the hallways,
the heating plant, etc. Remarkably flexible, the condominium is susceptible of an
endless variety of legal formulations and can be adapted to a multiplicity of land
uses or project designs. But in all of its forms its principal goal remains constant:
to enable occupants of a multi-unit project to achieve more concomitants of own-
ership than are now available either to renters or to cooperators. The realization
of this goal depends mainly on whether the individual units will gain independent
dignity as mortgage security and as a basis for property taxation.
Berger, Condominium Shelter, supra note 104, at 989. The condominium concept
was broadened in 1964 by the National Housing Act to include single family units that
were separate from the other units in a multifamily project. 12 U.S.C. § 1715y (1970).
This was designed to include condominiums developed in suburbs where individual own-
ers had their private unit unattached to the common areas. Some states followed by
amending their statutes to include the broader definition, so that a condominium can be
a high-rise or a lateral development. IND. CODE § 32-1-6-2 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 70-4-2 (Cum. Supp. 1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.2 (1969). Although many art-
icles have been written on condominiums, the application of the condominium concept
to adverse possession of urban housing is relatively unexplored. For comprehensive
bibliographies about condominiums, see E. BREVER, CONDOMINIUM (1962); FERaER &
STECHER, supra note 104, pt. VI; ROHAN & REsmN, supra note 104, app. A.
106. Nachman, Residential Condominium Representing the Purchaser, 51 MICH. ST.
B.J. 371, 373 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Nachman].
107. Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 251 N.Y.S.2d 321, 327 (Civ. Ct. City N.Y.
1964); FERRER & STECHER, supra note 104, § 3; Wenig & Schulz, Government Regulation
of Condominium in California, 14 HAS'INGs L.J. 222, 224 (1963).
The tenancy in common could be in a fee simple, a leasehold, or a life term.
Sometimes only the recreational area is leased for a certain period of time. See,
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combination of two types of ownership, of individual units and com-
mon areas, distinguishes condominiums from cooperatives and tradi-
tional home ownership.108 Conceptually, the natural division of aban-
doned apartment houses into individual units and common areas lends
itself to the utilization of the condominium concept.
1. Creation of the Condominium
Although condominiums can be created without enabling legisla-
tion,109 the structure and operation of the condominium-the declara-
tion, bylaws, and individual apartment deed-are usually established
by statute."0
The declaration is a recorded master deed containing the description
of the land encompassing the condominium project, the individual units,
and the common areas. It also has provisions designed to secure com-
e.g., Wechsler v. Goldman, 214 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1968); Ackerman v. Spring Lake of
Broward, Inc., 260 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972).
108. The traditional home ownership does not include a common interest area,
shared and owned with neighbors. The cooperative, most often compared with the
condominium, does not give any fee simple interest to the individual unit dweller.
Although there is no fee simple interest given for the individual unit, the undivided
fractional interest in the land and the entire building can be owned by all the owners
in fee simple. POWELL, supra note 104, § 633.2(3). For comparative advantages
of the cooperative, see Alpren & Hassenfeld, Condominium: A Functional Freehold in
the Metropolis, 5 AM. Bus. L.J. 127, 129 (1967); Note, Legal Characterization of
Individual's Interest in a Cooperative Apartment: Realty or Personalty?, 73 COLUM. L.
REv. 250, 258 (1973).
There are many different forms of' cooperative housing. The most common is
the stock cooperative in which ownership of stock entitles an individual to a proprie-
tary lease to possess a unit in a building owned by a corporate or business trust
entity. POWELL, supra note 104, §§ 633.1(3), 633.2.
Even though tax advantages are similar in all forms of homeownership, the units
of a cooperative complex are not financed separately, as in a condominium. Fokes,
Legal and Practical Aspects of Condominium, 19 Bus. LAW. 233, 234 (1963); Note,
Legal Characterization of Individual's Interest in a Cooperative Apartment: Realty
or Personalty?, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 250, 259 (1973). For practical aspects of tax
deductions, see Anderson, Some Tax Aspects of the Condominium, 1970 U. ILL.
L.F. 220. If one person should default on mortgage payments, others in the building
become liable for that share. Because each condominium unit is financed independently
by individual owners, default by one does not affect anyone else financially. This
financial independence is one of the major advantages of the condominium over the
cooperative. Alpren & Hassenfeld, Condominium: A Functional Freehold in the
Metropolis, 5 AM. Bus. L.J 127, 129 (1967); Fokes, Legal and Practical Aspects of
the Condominium, 19 Bus. LAw. 233, 234 (1963).
109. POWELL, supra note 104, § 633.8.
110. POWELL, supra note 104, § 633.7; Groswold, The Modern Concept of Condo-
miniums, 47 TrTLE NEws 83, 84 (1968); Rohan, Second Generation Condominium
Problem: Construction of Enabling Legislation & Project Documents, 1 VAL. U.L. R v.
77, 79 (1966); Comment, Condominium, 77 Hav. L. REv. 777, 778 (1964).
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patibility and financial security of the entire project: restriction on use,
occupation, and transfer;"' consequences of destruction, severance, and
termination;" 2 establishment of an association of owners; voting rights
and percentage ownership; method of sharing common expenses; and
organization of the management. 1 3 The bylaws are usually incor-
porated by reference into the declaration.": 4
The bylaws of the condominium can be divided into two categories.
The "condominium bylaws" contain provisions for administering the
day-to-day affairs: resolution of disputes, maintenance and repair, gen-
eral use restrictions, membership eligibility, and procedure for sale."5r
The "corporate bylaws" provide rules for voting, election and duties
of the board of directors and officers, and calling meetings."10 The
deed for the individual unit contains the vital information necessary to
transfer title to the unit owner." 7
The creation of the adversely possessed condominium, likewise,
would best be established by an enabling statute. Such a statutory
scheme, however, must do more than merely allow the creation of a
condominium. Instead, since its creation will not be initiated by a pri-
vate individual or group, the statutory scheme must establish a gov-
ernmental administrative agency to begin the process. This agency
would serve a management function in preparing the declaration, the
bylaws, and the individual deeds which would ultimately be trans-
ferred to the dwelling owners upon the termination of the statutory
period required for adverse possession.
The various provisions of these documents encompass a wide variety
of management functions which will be discussed in the following sec-
tion. A preliminary factor which the enabling statute must define is
the practical limitations on adverse possession, which will be prerequi-
111. Nachman, supra note 106, at 373; Note, Real Property-Georgia's Apartment
Ownership Act-Its Scope Analyzed in View of Emerging Condominium Litigation
in Other Jurisdictions, 23 MERCER L. REv. 405, 406 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ga.'s
Apt.].
112. Fokes, Legal and Practical Aspects of Condominium, 19 Bus. LAw. 233, 238
(1963); Ga.'s Apt., supra note 111, at 406.
113. Tully, Castle in the Air-The Condominium, 34 ALA. LAw. 28 (1973).
114. Nachman, supra note 106, at 373.
115. Id. PowEL, supra note 14, § 647.
116. Id. In the context of adverse possession, "corporate bylaws" may imply
a business sophistication not readily enjoyed by the low income adverse possessor.
With management by the government, however, such organizational tools as voting, offi-
cers and directors, and calling of owners' meetings could be significant as tools of
collective bargaining with the governmental management unit.
117. PowELL, supra note 104, § 633.27(4).
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site to the creation of the condominium. In Detroit, a plan has been
implemented whereby abandoned homes are being awarded to fami-
lies. 118  The Detroit scheme requires five elements to qualify: (1)
those applying must be 21 years of age or the head of a family; (2)
they must be United States citizens or declare their intention of being
naturalized; (3) -they must be financially able to provide $8,000 in re-
habilitation work to the home, or have trade skills to carry out such im-
provements; (4) they must begin renovating the home within sixty
days of taking residence and be able to bring it up to city building codes
within two years; (5) and they must live in the home at least five
years. 119 Although the financial commitment and the requirement of
complying with building code standards within two years may be
prohibitive to the low income adverse possessor, the Detroit plan at
least advances the type of considerations which should be included in
the bylaws and/or the declaration. The governmental administrative
agency and the enabling statute, therefore, would be crucial not only
in the initial creation of the condominium, but also in insuring that
the governmentally condoned adverse possessor would in fact intend
to make a substantial commitment to the dwelling unit and would not
be a mere transient looking for a temporary place to sleep.
2. Management of a Condominium
Since each unit owner in a residential condominium' 20 is also an
owner of the common elements as a tenant in common, theoretically,
each has an equal voice in the policies and decisions affecting the con-
dominium project. For the sake of efficiency, however, most con-
dominiums elect to have a board of directors or officers who represent
the owners.' 2 ' The technique of the elections, the size of the group,
and the powers it possesses vary from condominium to condominium
depending on the declaration and bylaws outlined in the particular con-
dominium or by ad hoc agreements among the owners. 122  Usually
the association of the owners elects a board of directors that enforces
118. See L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1973, § 1-A, at 3, col. 5. See also Wall Street
J., Sept. 21, 1973, 1, col. 1.
119. L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1973, § 1-A, at 3, col. 5.
120. Discussion will be limited to the residential type of condominium, not com-
mercial or resort, even though the general principles involved in all three are similar.
For commercial condominiums, see POWELL, supra note 104, § 633.8(2). For resort
condominiums, see 68 REAL ESTATE L. & PRAc. 1-707 (1973).
121. This is especially practical in large condominium projects where there may
be varying interest among the owners in being part of the administrative unit.
122. See notes 111-14 supra.
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the restrictions pertaining to use and occupancy. Typically, the direc-
tors are also empowered to enter into management contracts with profes-
sionals to carry out the daily maintenance and repair of the common
elements. 123  The hiring of professional management, though not nec-
essarily essential to a small condominium complex, is preferred by the
FHA and conventional mortgagees.'2 4 The duties of the management
hired by the officers of the association of owners (hereinafter referred
to as the management) vary according to the agreements with the offi-
cers. Generally, the duties or powers of the officers include enforce-
ment of the use and occupancy restriction, some or all of which can
be delegated to the management. In addition, assessment of common
expenses, which include maintenance and repair costs, 125 insurance,120
cost of renovation or construction of an addition to the common ele-
ments,127 and special assessments, such as for the acquisition of an in-
dividual unit through foreclosure128 or exercise of the right of first
refusal, 29 are made by the officers or the management before col-
lection from the unit owners. Sometimes, the units are able to vote
on a particular course of action, 30 such as major construction or ren-
ovation in a common area.
Once again, the adversely possessed condominium (hereinafter re-
ferred to as a government condominium) requires a managerial structure
different from the privately owned condominium. Initially, the pro-
fessional management hired by the directors of the association must
be replaced by the governmental administrative agency which will ex-
ercise all of the powers and duties traditionally relegated to the board
of directors.' 3' In essence, the government is acting as the developer
123. Cf. POWELL, supra note 104, § 633.36.
124. HUD, MORTGAGE INSURANCE FOR CONDOMINIUM HOUSING § 5-4(a) (1973).
Rohan, Condominium Housing: A Purchaser's Perspective, 17 STAN. L. REV. 842, 856
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Rohan, Purchaser's].
125. Roi N & REsKiN, supra note 104, § 6.02(3); Berger, Condominium Primer
for Fiduciaries, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 21, 23 (1965).
126. D. CLURMAN & E. HEBARD, CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVM 96-101 (1970);
Takabuki, Condominium Insurance: A Case History, 1967 A.B.A., SEC. INs., NEGL. &
CoMP. L. 206.
127. Amoruso v. Board of Managers of Westchester Hills Condominium, 330 N.Y.S.
2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
128. POWELL, supra note 104, § 633.36(2).
129. FERRER & STECHER, supra note 104, ch. 31; POWELL, supra note 104,
§ 633.36(5); ROHAN & RESMN, supra note 104, § 10.03; Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore
Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967).
130. PowELL, supra note 104, § 633.36(5); RoAN & RESmN, supra note 104,
§ 10.02.
131. See notes 125-129 supra and accompanying text. Since the state will hold
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of a private condominium before most of the units are sold and before
the occupants have sufficient cumulative interest in the project to or-
ganize and control it. Furthermore, since the adverse possessors will
not gain title for a statutorily defined period, there are in fact no "own-
ers," in the traditional sense of the word, who could constitute an as-
sociation capable of electing officers. The result is that the enabling
statute must create a managerial unit within the governmental struc-
ture which not only will have the initial responsibility of screening po-
tential owners, but also of securing utility services, supplying daily
maintenance and repair of the common elements, and controlling
use 3 2 and occupancy 3s restrictions, as well as assessing and collecting
title, it logically follows that the administrative agency should exercise the powers
and duties which the officers or directors usually have. This does not, however,
exclude the possibility of the government contracting with a professional management
organization as would a private ownership association. For the sake of simplicity,
reference will be made solely to governmental management.
132. Use restrictions deal with the house rules regulating the right of the individual
unit owner to use the property as he sees fit. They include conduct and activity inside
the individual unit as well as that related to the exteriors and common elements, such as
keeping a pet, storage of things in the common areas, and the hanging of an awn-
ing, canopy, or shutter on the outside walls of the building. RoHAN & RESKIN,
supra note 104, § 10.02. Alteration or construction of anything new is usually allowed
only with permission from the board of directors. Naturally, there is much more
freedom in the use of the inside of an apartment than the common elements or
exterior. At times it is difficult to determine the common elements. In one Florida
case, for example, an owner was ordered to remove the glass jalousies he had added
and to return the enclosures to their original screened condition. Sterling Village
Condominium, Inc. v. Breitenbach, 251 So. 2d 685 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971). The
officers and directors of the managing corporation, drawn from the owners of the
condominium, had sought a mandatory injunction to require the defendant unit owner
not to make the material alteration he desired, after he had originally requested
permission as required by the declaration, but was denied the permission. Id. at
686. Compare Vinik v. Taylor, 270 So. 2d 413 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972), where one
unit owner sought to enjoin another unit owner from enclosing his balcony, after
the board of directors had given the defendant permission to make the alteration.
In upholding the defendant's contention that the balcony is not a common element,
the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision in denying the injunction.
Id. at 417. Perhaps the distinguishing feature between the two cases is the approval
or lack of it by the board of directors of the condominium, presumably representing
the consensus of the majority of the owners.
133. Occupancy restriction is enforced in the form of the right of first refusal
or preemption right. See note 129 supra. Although this right can be expressed
by the management, it is often retained by the board of directors or is determined
by vote of the majority of the unit owners. This is a form of restraint on aliena-
tion regulating who the prospective buyers can be by requiring that: (1) the unit
owner sell his condominium only with the approval of a specified entity, or (2)
that the faction representing the owners be allowed to exercise the option to match
the selling price and acquire the unit, or (3) that the buyer will be supplied by
the aforementioned faction. Gale v. York Center Community Cooperative, Inc., 171
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common expenses. 134  Enforcement mechanisms must also be deline-
N.E.2d 30 (MI. 1960); PowELL, supra note 104, § 633.36(4)(b). There is a general
public policy against restraints on alienation, for they keep property out of commerce
while allowing it to concentrate in a few and they prevent income or improvements
to be made. RoHNi & REsKiN, supra note 104, § 10.3(1). In order to overcome
this public policy, the restraints must be reasonable. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 406 (1944). The reasonableness has been determined by the balancing, among
other things, of the utility of the restraints against the harm of such enforcement.
Gale v. York Center Community Cooperative, Inc., 171 N.E.2d 30 (Ill. 1960). See
also Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967).
Despite social and economic benefits, the restraints would still be invalid if used
to discriminate against race, color, or creed. See Berger, Condominium Shelter, supra
note 104, at 1017-19. The Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, or an applicable
state or local fair housing code, are likely to be used as authority to attack racial
restraints in condominiums. Note, however, that a racial or religious restraint on
alienation is not likely to appear as an express ingredient of a right of preemption.
The blanket authority in a condominium management to exercise its right for any
reason lends itself to use as a racial restraint without express statement of such
an objective in the condominium declaration. Browder, Restraints on the Aliena-
tion of Condominium Units (The Right of First Refusal), 1970 U. ILL. LF. 231, 256-57
[hereinafter cited as Browder].
Another hurdle to be considered before exercising the right of first refusal is the
rule against perpetuities, which limits the time of exercising the right. It is usually
held to be an option in gross to be limited to continue until the expiration of
twenty-one years after the life of the last survivor of a specified group. Id. at
256. Writers have argued that the rule against perpetuties should not apply to the
condominium ownership (id.), although only a few states have enacted statutes which
hold that the rule against perpetuities shall not defeat any right of the unit owner
of use, occupancy, or transfer of the units given by a declaration or bylaw of a
condominium. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.08(2) (1969); ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 30,
§ 320 (1969); NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-807 (1971); NEv. REV. STAT. § 117.103 (1967);
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 34-36-28 (1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-28 (1963).
To remain within the limits of the rule, where it is still held to be applicable,
writers suggest the use of an arbitrary standard which would not exceed the period
of the rule. POWELL, supra note 104, § 633.14(2); Browder, supra at 256.
Occupancy restrictions are generally viewed with favor since they are designed
to promote harmony among people living in close proximity of each other. Their
validity is upheld unless there is a strong countervailing policy against them, such
as the policy against racial discrimination. In the context of government condomin-
iums, occupancy restrictions will probably be statutorily defined initially in view of
the nature of acquisition by the adverse possessor. See text accompanying note 119
supra. Sale after title has transferred from the state to the adverse possessor may
render further occupancy restrictions necessary, and provisions dealing with such prob-
lems can be included in the bylaws and/or declaration. The economic background
of the potential purchaser may be an unnecessary criterion.
134. The assessment and collection of common expenses is central to the survival
of the private condominium. The assessment is based on expenses declared as
such by provisions of the condominium statutes, or the declaration, or the bylaws,
or by separate agreement of the unit owners.
Common expenses often approach 10%-15% of total monthly expenses. Ross, Condo-
minium and Preemptive Options-the Right of First Refusal, 18 HAS'rlNGs L.J. 585,
601 (1967). California and Nevada have statutes specifying that each unit has an
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equal share in the common areas, rather than on a percentage basis. CAL. Civ. CoDE
§ 1353(b) (West 1970); NEV. R y. STAT. § 117.090 (1969); ROHAN & REsKUn-, supra
note 104, §§ 6.01(3), 6.02(2), 6.03. The proportionate share paid by each unit
owner may be prorated according to the declaration or bylaws, or it may be ac-
cording to the value of the unit. The share paid by each could be equal or according
to the proportionate share of the common elements owned. Where individual units
vary in prices and ownership of the common elements, the higher priced unit owners
would have to pay a larger share of the common expenses than those of the lower
priced units.
Ostensibly, the requirement of such extensive assessments may render the concept
of adversely possessed condominiums inefficacious. Since the claimants will most
likely have low incomes, it is arguable that requiring the payment of assessments
will exclude many potential owners, but an adverse possessor would not pay rent,
thus freeing money usually used for rent to cover assessments for common expenses.
But, also, see note 95 supra. If a scheme similar to the Detroit plan is implemented,
however, an initial investment is mandatory, thus tending to exclude many families.
See text accompanying note 119 supra. Clearly, at least an incipient infusion of
governmental funds would be necessary to insure an open market to all claimants.
See notes 166-68 supra and accompanying text.
In private condominiums, there is usually no controversy over payment of expenses
which are regularly expected, such as tax, insurance, and cost of maintenance and
repair, but differences are likely to arise for a special assessment, an unexpected
expense. Even if approval by the unit owners by a vote is necessary before incur-
ring the special common expense, often only a majority, not a unanimous, vote
is required. POWELL, supra note 104, §§ 633-36(2). The leeway given the board
of directors or management for use of common funds for additions or improvements
is often authorized by statute, the declaration, or the bylaws. Cf. Amoruso v. Board
of Managers of Westchester Hills Condominium, 330 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (Sup. Ct.
1972).
135. The remedies available for violations of the use and occupancy restrictions
and for delinquent payment of common expenses are similar in private condominiums.
They include imposition of a fine, attachment of a lien, or institution of a law
suit for damages, breach of covenant, or injunction. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-
4-7 (Supp. 1973); Berger, Condominium Shelter, supra note 104, at 1012; Comment,
Community Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative, 50 CALIF. L. Ray. 299,
319 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Community]. The effectiveness of these remedies
on a low income adverse possessor appears tenuous at best. If the claimant is sincere
in his bid for a home and has devoted time and energy so that he may become
an owner of decent housing, these possible remedies may be adequate.
Legal actions are generally appropriate for conduct or activity violating the use
or occupancy restrictions. Berger, Condominium Shelter, supra note 104, at 1012.
See, e.g., Gale v. York Center Community Cooperative, Inc., 171 N.E.2d 30 (Il. 1960).
Fines are effective for minor infractions. The attachment of a lien to an individual
unit is usually done in reference to unpaid common expenses or assessments. See,
e.g., FHA MODEL STATUTE FOR THE CREATION OF APARTMENT OWNERSHIP §§ 9, 23
(Form No. 3285, 1962); N.Y. REAL PRO1". LAw § 339-z (McKinney 1968); POWELL,
supra note 104, § 633.31; RoHAN & REsKIN, supra note 104, § 6.04(2)(a); Berger,
Condominium Shelter, supra note 104, at 1010-11; Community, supra at 319; Comment,
Condominium, 77 HAgv. L. REV. 777, 779-80 (1964). One way to impose the lien
is to make it effective when the unit is sold. The lien then ripens and the delinquent
payments are collected from the sale proceeds. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1018 (Supp.
1967); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 339-z (McKinney 1968).
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As the dwelling fills, the claimants can elect officers as do the own-
ers of private condominiums. The primary distinction should be that
the officers of the government condominium will serve solely as rep-
resentatives of the claimants in voicing opinions and lodging complaints
with the governmental managerial unit. Consequently, their function
will be essentially representative and not managerial.', 6
3. Tort Liability
18 7
What is to happen if someone is injured in a common area? The
answer should depend on who that someone happens to be.
If the injured person were a third party, non-resident of the build-
ing,8 s his recovery might be governed by the common law rule of
Note that an effective and practical method may be illustrated by the statutes
of Alaska and Washington. See ALAS. STAT. § 34.07.220 (1971); WASH. REv.
CODE AN. § 64.32.200(a) (1966). They authorize the discontinuance of all utility
services until the assessment is paid, as long as notice is given to the delinquent
owners and the majority of the other owners approve. ROHAN & RESKiN, supra
note 104, § 6.04(1). It is debatable whether this remedy is viable in the context
of government condominiums.
136. Perhaps, when the abandoned dwelling is filled and the statutory period has
run thus resulting in the transfer of title to the individual claimants, the officers
can gradually assume more of the managerial tasks. Eventually, governmental man-
agement may be phased out completely, and the governmental condominium can be-
come a private condominium.
137. Contractual liability is also an area of potential difficulty. As representatives
for the association of owners of a private condominium, contracts entered into
by the officers are binding on the owners. Cf. Berger, The Condominium-Cooperative
Comparison, 11 PRAc. LAw. 37, 40 (1965).
If the officers are empowered to hire professional management, contracts made
on behalf of the association by the management are also binding upon the owners
due to the agency principle. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2330 (West 1970). Even though
there is no express or written authority for the management to enter a particular
contract, the owners can still be held based on the theory of ostensible agency.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2334 (West 1970). Additionally, it is difficult for the unit owners
to cancel a contract if they had knowledge of it previously. Wechsler v. Goldman,
214 So. 2d 741, 744 (Fla. 1968); cf. Fountainview Ass'n, Inc. v. Bell, 201 So.
2d 657 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967). Note that in the context of government condomini-
ums, many of the contractual difficulties would be avoided by the fact that the govern-
ment administrative agency would be the contracting party and the government would
hold legal title to the building and land. Consequently, any contractual liability would
fall upon the government rather than upon the adverse possessors.
138. Whether or not a plaintiff has standing to sue in a tort action depends on
his relationship to the managerial unit. A third party, non-resident of the condomin-
ium, of course, has such standing. In California at least, the condominium owner
also has standing to sue the unincorporated association if the condominium associa-
tion possesses an existence separate from its members and if the members do not
retain direct control over the operations of the association. White v. Cox, 17 Cal.
App. 3d 824, 829, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259, 262 (1971). See also Note, White v. Cox:
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joint and several liability among owners of an unincorporated associa-
tion.189 The primary danger of joint and several liability is the risk of
an injury within the common elements being used as a basis for an
action against one or a limited number of owners. Even if the negli-
gence were attributable to the management, the owners could be sued
because of the ownership or agency relationship.140  Some states do
not allow the right of contribution from the other owners14 ' thus per-
mitting the plaintiff to select a few defendants to bear the burden of
the many.
Such is the danger connected with private condominium ownership.
Under the government condominium concept, no such risk exists in
the early stages of condominium creation. The government is the sole
title holder with exclusive control over the common areas. Conse-
quently, any tort action must necessarily be brought against the gov-
ernment, for the adverse possessors are neither owners nor members of
an unincorporated ownership association and are thus not subject to
tort actions in this context.
Significantly, however, upon the termination of the statutory period,
the adverse possessors become the owners. Unfortunately, the benef-
icent transfer of title will be accompanied by a newly acquired tort lia-
Tort Actions Against the Condominium Association-Implications for the Individual
Owner, 8 CAL. W.L. REv. 536 (1972); Note, Condominiums-Member of Unincorpo-
rated Association of Condominium Owners Permitted to Bring Personal Injury Action
Against Association for Negligent Maintenance of Common Areas, 40 FoRDHAM L. REV.
627 (1972); Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1171 (1972). For a discussion of whether or
not a management organization can sue third parties for damages to the condominium
see Friendly Village Community Ass'n, Inc. v. Silva & Hill Constr. Co., 31 Cal. App.
3d 220, 225, 107 Cal. Rptr. 123, 126 (1973).
139. See W. PROSSER, ToRTs § 72 (4th ed. 1971); Berger, Condominium Primer
for Fiduciaries, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 21, 22 (1965). Clearly, the traditional prohibi-
tion against unincorporated associations suing and being sued is beginning to erode.
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b); CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 388 (West 1970); Inglis v. Operating
Eng'rs Local 12, 58 Cal. 2d 269, 270, 373 P.2d 467, 467-68, 23 Cal. Rptr. 403, 403-04
(1962); Marshall v. International Longshoremen's Union, 57 Cal. 2d 781, 784, 371
P.2d 987, 989, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211, 213 (1962); People v. Sobiek, 30 Cal. App. 3d 458,
467-68, 106 Cal. Rptr. 519, 524-25 (1973); White v. Cox, 17 Cal. App. 3d 824, 827,
95 Cal. Rptr. 259, 261 (1971); H. OLECK, No N-PRO Frr CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS,
AND ASSOCIATIONS § 226 (2d ed. 1965); Crane, Liability of Unincorporated Association
for Tortious Injury to a Member, 16 VAND. L. REv. 319, 320 (1963).
140. See CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 384 (West 1970); RoHAN & REsKIN, supra
note 104, § 1OA-6.1; Community, supra note 135, at 312-14. See also Coats v. Con-
struction Local 185, 15 Cal. App. 3d 908, 913, 93 Cal. Rptr. 639, 641 (1971); Hinson v.
Olson, 23 Cal. App. 2d 227, 230, 72 P.2d 890, 892 (1937); W. PROSSER, TORTS
§ 72 (4th ed. 1971); 86 C.J.S.2d Tenancy in Common § 143 (1954).
141. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 50 (4th ed. 1971).
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bility. 42  It will not suffice to argue that the claimants in government
condominiums are low income families and that judgments against
them would be unenforceable. If they were to have any assets at all,
for example, the newly acquired housing unit, a judgment could prove
extremely detrimental. Although it might be contended that given the
choice between suing the governmental management unit and suing
low income condominium owners, the tort plaintiff would invariably
reach for the deep pocket, such legal strategy does not immunize the
owner from potential liability. Furthermore, if an action were suc-
cessfully advanced against the government, it is quite possible that the
judgment would be satisfied from owner assessments. In light of these
possibilities, condominium tort liability must be considered.
In some states, statutory limitations have helped to ease the risk of
unlimited liability. Only a few states, however, directly provide for this
protection, 14 3 and all too often the statutes are unclear and incomplete
in their protection against unlimited tort liability. Many states, in-
cluding California, have no such statutes.144  In surveying the statu-
tory provisions dealing with tort liability, it becomes apparent that most
statutes address themselves to few of the many problems connected
with this area.
145
Statutes in Florida,'46 Mississippi, 47 and New Jersey, 48 for exam-
ple, expressly state that owners are not held personally liable for dam-
ages caused by the management association or for damages connected
with the use of the common elements. Presumably, this would mean
142. See text accompanying notes 139-141 supra.
143. For statutes which do, however, make provision for the tort liability of the
unit owners' association see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.18 (1969); IDAHo CODE § 55-
1515 (Supp. 1966); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 26-50(22) (Supp. 1971); MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 896-15 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-26 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
79.37(2) (1969).
144. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1357 (West Supp. 1971). No reference is made to
tortious adcts, only to labor, service, or materials.
145. See RoHAN & REsKiN, supra note 104, at § 10A.03 (3).
146. (1) The liability of the owner of a unit for common expenses shall be lim-
ited to the amounts for which he is assessed from time to time in accordance with
this law, the declaration and bylaws.
(2) The owner of a unit shall have no personal liability for any damages
caused by the association on or in connection with the use of the common ele-
ments.
FIA. STAT. ANN. § 711.18 (1969).
147. Miss. CODE ANN. § 896.15 (Supp. 1968).
148. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-16(c) (Supp. 1973). Despite the lack of personal
liability for the torts of the association, the resulting judgment against an association
would probably be paid by the owners as part of the common expenses. RoHAN & RES-
KrN, supra note 104, § 1OA.03(2).
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that liability would be spread to all the owners through a common
expense. Similarly, Alaska14' and Washington 5" allow tort actions for
damages arising out of the common elements to be brought against
the association only. Individual liability is absolved by paying the
proportionate share of the resulting judgment as a special assessment
of a common expense. Some statutes' 5' merely limit the liability to the
unit owner's proportionate share of the judgment without mention of
who the party defendant would be. This does not necessarily mean
that a plaintiff cannot hold one owner completely liable; it only im-
plies that the owners must contribute among themselves.' 52 Also,
multiple suits may be necessary to enforce payment by each owner. 53
Virginia gives very limited protection by holding the owner not liable
for the negligence of the other owners unless "the negligent co-owner
is acting for the council og co-owners."'154 This offers no help in de-
termining tort liability in connection with the common areas."' There
may also be an implication of unlimited personal liability for the torts
of management personnel.
56
149. (a) Without limiting the rights of an apartment owner, a cause of action
may be brought by the manager or board of directors, in either case in the discre-
tion of the board of directors, on behalf of two or more apartment owners, as
their respective interests may appear, with respect to a cause of action relating to
the common areas and facilities of more than one apartment.
(b) A cause of action relating to the common areas and facilities for damages
arising out of tortious conduct shall be maintained only against the association of
apartment owners and a judgment lien or other charges is a common expense. The
judgment lien or charge is removed from an apartment and its percentage of undi-
vided interest in the common areas and facilities upon payment by the respective
owner of his proportionate share based on the percentage of undivided interest
owned by him.
ALAS. STAT. § 34.07.260 (1971).
150. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.32.240 (Supp. 1966). The tort judgment contemplated
is also a common expense. Michigan's statute may be similar in providing that
suits "against the co-owners shall be in the name of the condominium project." MicH.
STAT. ANN. § 26-50(22) (Supp. 1966).
151. In the event of entry of a final judgment as a lien against two or more unit
owners, the unit owners of the separate units may remove their unit and their per-
centage interest in the common elements from the lien thereof by payment of the
fractional proportional amounts attributable to each of the units affected. Said
individual payment shall be computed by reference to the percentage established
pursuant to section 5-906. After such partial payment, partial discharge, or re-
lease or other satisfaction, the unit owner and his percentage interest in the com-
mon elements shall thereafter be free and clear of the lien of such judgment.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-924 (1967). Compare IDbAo CODE ANN. § 55-1515 (Supp. 1966);
MD. ANN. CODE, art. 21, § 138 (Supp. 1967).
152. Schwartz, Condominium: A Hybrid Castle in the Air, 44 B.U.L. REv. 137, 147
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
153. Comment, Condominium, 77 HIv. L. REv. 777, 778 (1964).
154. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.37(2) (Supp. 1972).
155. RoHAN & REsKiN, supra note 104, § 10A.03(2); Comment, Condominiums In-
corporation of the Common Elements-a Proposal, 23 VAND. L. REv. 321, 346 (1970).
156. RoHAN & REsKiN, supra note 104, § 10A.03(2).
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Another statutory variation expressly permits the claimant to pro-
ceed against the unit owners after first exhausting the available reme-
dies against the association of unit owners.' 57 Uncertainties here in-
clude whether or not exhausting the available remedies would include
levying an execution on the condominium; what effect a unit owner's
negligence would have on the suit; whether or not payment of an aliquant
share of the unpaid balance would exonerate an owner from further
liability; and whether or not the liability for the unpaid balance
would be joint and several.'5"
The FH-A Model Statute, from which most enabling state statutes
were drawn, contains no provision for the limitation of tort liability.'
With statutory aid lacking, the condominium owner must look else-
where. Liability insurance could ease the burden of the problem if
there were adequate coverage, 160 but, even then, the coverage obtained
by the officers or management might be inadequate, the terms or condi-
tions might not be fulfilled, or the policy could lapse without a re-
newal.161 Without other means of protection, the individual unit owner
might be dangerously exposed.
Tort liability arises out of ownership of the common areas. Con-
ceptually, therefore, if ownership is removed, so is liability. This logic
appears to support the idea that while title to the individual units should
transfer, title to the common areas should remain in the state. This
is similar to the suggestion that the common elements should be incor-
157. Any individual, corporation, partnership, association, trustee, or other le-
gal entity claiming damages for injuries without any participation by a unit owner
shall first exhaust all available remedies against the association of unit owners
prior to proceeding against any unit individually.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-26 (Supp. 1966).
158. RoAN & RESKIN, supra note 104, § 10A.03 (2).
159. F.H.A. MODEL STATUTE FOR THE CREATION OF HOME OWNERSHIP § 9 (Form No.
3285, 1962). Most of the state statutes were modeled after this statute.
In the event a lien against two or more apartments becomes effective, the apart-
ment owners of the separate apartments may remove their apartment and the per-
centage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appurtenant to
such apartment from the lien by payment of the fractional or proportional amounts
attributable to each of the apartments affected. . . . Such partial payment...
shall not prevent the lienor from proceeding to enforce his rights against any
apartment ....
Id. § 9(6), quoted in FERRER & STECHER, supra note 104, § 1015.2.
160. See D. CLURMAN & E. HEBARD, CONDOMINIUMS & COOPERATIVES 95-102 (1970);
POWELL, supra note 104, § 633.36; ROHAN & RESmN, supra note 104, § 10A.05(2)(A);
Rohan, Disruption of the Condominium Venture: The Problems of Casualty Loss and
Insurance, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1045, 1050 (1964).
161. POWELL, supra note 104, § 633.36; Knight, Incorporation of Condominium
Common Areas? An Alternative, 50 N.C.L. REv. 1, 6 (1971); Schreiber, supra note
104, at 1144.
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porated so that suit must be brought only against the corporation, thus
shielding the owners. 16 2  As in the case of incorporation, however,
the shield of separate ownership may be penetrated, and the owners
may be held liable as undisclosed or partially disclosed principals in
an agency relationship.1 6
3
Ultimately, statutory enactment must outline two requirements.
Initially, if a judgment is entered against the association, each unit
owner must be responsible only for his aliquant share. Payment of
this aliquant share should absolve the owner from further liability.
Secondly, mandatory insurance must be required to cover negligence of
both the owners and the management in connection with the common
elements. Such insurance will be obtained by the governmental man-
agerial unit and financed by owner assessment. The adoption of this
two-prong measure will insure that low income claimants will be
protected from tort liability, thus guaranteeing that the commitment
to their homes, in both time and money, will not be for naught.
D. Landlord Eviction
Abandonment is an unfortunate but organic process. There must
be a delicate balance, however, between promoting adverse claims once
apartments have been abandoned, and forcing landlords out by mak-
ing life intolerable. Currently, the legal process is ineffective. The
law has extended remedies to tenants for the obnoxious behavior of
landlords.'6 4 A corollary right has not been established protecting
landlords from the conduct of their tenants. The California Civil Code
specifies minimal affirmative obligations on the part of tenants,' 65 but
162. Schreiber, supra note 104, at 1143-44; Teaford, Homeownership for Low-In-
come Families: The Condominium, 21 HASTNGS L.J. 243, 267-68 (1970).
163. See Note, Community Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative?, 50
CALrF. L. REv. 299, 312 (1962); cf. RORAN & REsKiN, supra note 104, § 6.04(1).
164. Aweeka v. Bonds, 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 281, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650, 652 (1971)
(plaintiff tenant allowed to sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress where
defendant landlord attempted a retaliatory eviction against the tenant).
165. CAL. CIr. CODE § 1942.2 (West 1970):
(a) No duty on the part of the lessor shall arise under Section 1941 or 1942
if the lessee is in substantial violation of any of the following affirmative obliga-
tions:
(1) To keep that part of the premises which he occupies and uses clean and
sanitary as the condition of the premises permits.
(2) To dispose from his dwelling unit of all rubbish, garbage, and other waste,
in a clean and sanitary manner.
(3) To properly use and operate all electrical, gas, and plumbing fixtures and
keep them as clean and sanitary as their condition permits.
(4) Not to permit any person on the premises, with his permission to willfully
or wantonly destroy, deface, damage, impair or remove any part of the structure
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these merely act as a condition precedent to the landlord's obligation to
repair. Eviction is a possible legal tool, but the effort involved in re-
peated evictions can predispose a landlord to leave a marginal venture.
Predatory tactics could drive the landlord out, for the statute provides
no remedy other than to refuse repair, a move which can only mean
that abandonment is one step closer.
To ask the question, however, is to answer it. The problem is whe-
ther or not tenants will destroy a building in order to force abandon-
ment and thereby gain ownership by adverse possession. It must be
recognized that there is a limit to deterioration, a point at which govern-
mentally condoned adverse possession would no longer be practical.
Tenants who will eventually have to repair and maintain the condo-
minium unit, have no incentive to inherit a useless mound of rubble.
Consequently, those desiring to own their own housing would be less
likely to destroy the premises, especially at the risk of condemnation.
E. Cost v. Benefit
Money is the central dilemma of most urban projects. The need for
funds, however, neither detracts from nor distinguishes the concept of
adverse possession of abandoned urban housing.
Senators Cranston and Goodel introduced legislation addressed to
"[tihe growing problem of abandoned properties and neighborhoods."'""
The bill would have empowered the Secretary of HUD to
make grants ...for the purpose of assisting such localities in car-
rying out programs to alleviate harmful conditions or prevent deteri-
oration in neighborhoods where the local governing body has deter-
mined that a substantial number of properties have been abandoned
or foresees that the problem of abandonment may arise.'
67
Money could be expended on public utilities, sidewalks, streets,
improvement of private properties, and demolition of gutted build-
ings.168 Unfortunately, the bill never reached the floor of the House.
or dwelling unit or the facilities, equipment, or appurtenances thereto, nor himself
to do any such thing.
(5) To occupy the premises as his abode, utilizing portions thereof for living,
sleeping, cooking or dining purposes only which are respectively designed or in-
tended to be used for such occupancies.
(b) Paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) shall not apply if the lessor has
expressly agreed in writing to perform the act or acts mentioned therein.
166. S. 4087, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
167. Id.
168. Id.
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Assuming that money were available, the question remains: who
should receive it? One might urge that present landlords, the rightful
owners of the property, should be granted money to subsidize their
continued stay. Such a solution presumes the comparative advantage
of their continued presence, a presumption not supported by exper-
ience. In a survey of landlords in Newark, New Jersey, for example,
three-quarters of the landlords questioned responded negatively to the
question: "Would you improve the property if given a long-term mort-
gage?"169  Prominent among this group of negative respondents were
many aged owners, people disinterested in any rehabilitation. 170  These
results should be contrasted with other findings of the same study.
The researchers discovered that maintenance expenditures of resident
owners were significantly larger than those for equivalent units with
non-resident ownersY.1 7  The Rutgers Urban Studies Center thus con-
cluded, "[The prime generator of good maintenance is owner-residence.
It is the only factor that produces the degree of close supervision
required for good maintenance of slum properties."' 72  From the
standpoint of the building's future, therefore, it would be better to
have resident owners closely interested in the property. Thus, it
would appear that the better solution would be to utilize any available
funds to establish the governmental management agency and to per-
haps provide low income renovation loans to claimants willing to
repair their newly acquired dwellings.
In terms of a cost-benefit analysis, the social benefits presumably
outweigh the economic detriment. The pride and dignity ingrained
in home ownership are part of the American heritage of self-reliance.
The general policy to use land to its maximum efficiency can only be
furthered if low income tenants know that they have the potential for
a permanent economic stake in abandoned property. The stability en-
gendered should minimize vandalism (now infesting abandoned housing)
and alienation. Thus, the reduced period of statutory abandonment
would serve to minimize the period during which further waste to the
property might be committed. The governmental agency necessary
to manage the condominium projects should be established in light of
the emerging awareness of the need for adequate housing for the poor,
as evidenced by the 1968 amendment to the National Housing Act.
169. G. STERNUE, THE TEmmmNT LANDLORD 196 (1966).
170. Id. at xvi.
171. Id. at 174.
172. Id. at xiii.
197,4]
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The expenses of the agency would be partly reimbursed by the claim-
ants as a common expense. After all the units are occupied, the com-
mon expenses paid by each occupant might possibly offset the cost of
managing the common areas. Thus, the cost of the agency would
only be significant at the inception, when most of the units are unoc-
cupied. Those costs would be offset in the long run by savings in
areas which would have required additional expenditure due to the
problems arising from the social and economic ramifications of neigh-
borhoods infested with abandoned housing.
CONCLUSION
Adverse possession of abandoned urban housing is an untried solu-
tion to the inner-urban housing dilemma. It is a means of curtailing
urban waste and destruction by providing low income families with an
opportunity for home ownership. Ingrained in this scheme is the ele-
ment of self-help. Tenants who previously may have added to the de-
struction of urban dwellings will now have an interest in their homes-
an interest embodied with the pride of ownership. Potential con-
tributors to the problem will have the opportunity and incentive to al-
leviate the problem and to participate in its solution.
Although the implementation of this scheme gives rise to many
structural difficulties, they could be surmounted by statutory changes.
A material element of this alteration would be the utilization of con-
dominiums as a solution to management and liability difficulties. Con-
dominiums have been recognized as a potential source of low income
housing."' The major difficulty in adoption of such a scheme, how-
ever, is obtaining the necessary enabling statutes. One author sum-
marizes:
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 dedicates itself to
the idea that private home ownership is a beneficial social institution
in the United States in which lower-income families should partici-
pate. In the urban environment condominiums appear to be the most
promising form of private ownership housing since they make efficient
use of the land but retain, to the maximum extent possible, the values
associated with private home ownership . . . [I]f the strengths of
condominiums can be effectively promoted through legislation, and if
173. See Hick, Lower Income Housing: Condominium vs. Cooperative, 59 ILL. B.J.
62 (1970); Quirk, Wein & Gomberg, A Draft Program of Housing Reform-the Tenant
Condominium, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 361 (1968); Comment, Condominiums and the
1968 Housing and Urban Development Act: Putting the Poor in Their Place, 43 S. CAL.
L. REv. 309 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Condominium].
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its forward-looking provisions can be fully implemented, private urban
home ownership may one day be available to all the people of Amer-
ica, not just the wealthy.
174
Adverse possession of abandoned urban housing has the potential
for abuse. It may also, however, provide alternatives to abandonment,
destruction, and two midnight cowboys seeking refuge in the wind.
Jeffrey S. Kravitz
Nancy K. Chiu
174. Condominium, supra note 173, at 328.
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